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The Michelstaedter Enigma
Thomas Harrison
If ever there was one who, in Nietzsche's words, was born
posthumously it was Carlo Michelstaedter. And doubly so: The first
birth was a natural one, which for a variety of reasons he experienced
as death. The second was the result of critical "exhumations," repeated
discoveries of his work in the decades that have ensued since his suicide in 1910. The most recent phase of this second coming begins
when his sister Paula dies in 1972 and bequeaths Michelstaedter's
manuscripts and paintings to her son Carlo Winteler. He, in turn,
donates them to the Biblioteca Civica di Gorizia, where an archive is
promptly established as the Fondo Michelstaedter. Two years later
Professor Sergio Campailla takes over the task of putting order into
the works, and the complete writings of Michelstaedter begin to be
published by Adelphi Edizioni in Milan. His drawings, paintings, and
biography also come to light. Campailla himself writes three definitive
studies of the unusual artist. 1
In the wake of the impressive
advances of the Fondo
Michelstaedter, now directed by Dr. Antonella Gallarotti, a question
confronts all those who work in the field of modern Italian: Is
Michelstaedter truly a figure of singular artistic stature or just an interesting anomaly? Is he part of our century's cultural fodder or can we
bypass his work without any significant loss?
The enigmas embedded in the Michelstaedter phenomenon
make these questions all but unavoidable. He is not only an Italian,
but also a Jew and, by citizenship, an Austro-Hungarian. He is as
much of a painter and a poet as a philosopher. A great celebrator of
life, he is also the consummate nihilist of Western history. As philosophers like Croce and Gentile recognized in the twenties, the celebrated
work Michelstaedter wrote as a dissertation for the Universita degli
Studi di Firenze (La persuasionee la rettorica,finished literally on the
eve of his death at age twenty-three) is anything but systematic. 2 It
proposes, but describes it in a way that is impossible to practice.
Michelstaedter demands that his life live up to his thought, but
respects no thought not already spontaneously prompted by life. He
inveighs against the temptations of rhetoric in one of the most rhetorical pieces of writing we have. Advocating independence of mind, he
bases his arguments on classical sources. Insisting that knowledge is
relative to the knower, he postulates universal, independent, metaphysical truths. Finally, while expressing an overweening contempt
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for language, he takes his words seriously to the point of being ready
to sacrifice literally everything for them.
To make matters worse, Michelstaedter denies us the aesthetic,
reader's distance we are used to enjoying. His categorical, moralizing
descriptions of life force us to decide at once: either he is right or he is
wrong. We cannot assimilate his views without changing our thinking.
Scoffing at everything most people accept when not living intellectually, Michelstaedter obliges us to consider whether we can find a place
for his radical positions in the pictures we have already built of the
world. And this, too, is why the question of his contemporary relevance must be addressed directly.
To a great extent, this question is already answered by the very
nature of the most recent Michelstaedter readings. They show 1) that
Michelstaedter has acquired international dimensions and 2) that he
has been deeply assimilated into important debates of contemporary
philosophy. Three readings in particular-amon~
ten or so booklength studies that have followed Campailla's work -bring these two
dimensions of the Michelstaedter renaissance into high relief: Daniela
Bini's CarloMichelstaedterand the Failureof Language,the articles published in the pages of Differentia by the philosopher Mario Perniola,
and the two essays by another of Italy's most eminent rhilosophers,
Massimo Cacciari, in his recent French collection, DPAN. Bini's study
is the most complete and contextualized monograph to date (and the
first in English) on the entire extent of Michelstaedter's
artistic
achievements. Cacciari' s and Perniola' s studies show manners in
which Michelstaedter's thinking has been appropriated by contemporary philosophy. In one way or another, all future interpretations of
Michelstaedter will have to pass through these three decisive recuperations. Here I want only to initiate this passage, suggesting additional
byways in the process.
In the face of the interpretive difficulties attending the work of
Michelstaedter, Daniela Bini's sensitive treatment of this figure in her
recent book comes as a remarkable achievement. It covers the full
range of issues attending Michelstaedter's work; it preserves unflinching aplomb in the face of his paradoxes; it reads as an elegant narrative, recounting each twist and turn in Michelstaedter' s artistic, biographical, and spiritual development. Most important, perhaps, it
performs precisely that act of contextualization which Michelstaedter
requires of his audience, convincingly demonstrating the numerous
ties between his work and that of towering figures of our spiritual tradition (Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle; Heraclitus and Parmenides;
Buddha and Christ; Leopardi and Pirandello). Here is an extraordinarily complete vision of Michelstaedter in European context, providing
not only exemplary treatment of the difficult arguments of La persuasione e la rettoricabut also in-depth analyses of his poetry and visual
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art. In fact, Bini's study will remain a model and primary source for
those who would engage in any detailed
examination
of
Michelstaedter's
artistic work. Both on the visual and the literary
front, it offers a consistently acute commentary to the numerous contributions of this "comet in the sky" of early twentieth century Italian
art.
Bini's assessment of Michelstaedter's
importance is strongly
affirmative. His philosophy is given eminent credit, likened not only
to his great pre-Socratic models, but also to the two masters of our century, Martin Heidegger and Ludwig Wittgenstein. 5 His drawings and
paintings are compared to those of the commanding Expressionists,
Oscar Kokoschka, Ernst Ludwig Kirchner, and Erich Heckel. His poetry is illuminated by references to Eugenio Montale.
The concluding sentence of Bini's panoramic study brings
Michelstaedter directly within the purview of issues with which we, in
the United States, are particularly at home: issues of linguistic negativity and difference associated with a whole line of thinkers from
Georges Bataille to Jacques Derrida, from Maurice Blanchot to
Emmanuel Levinas. "It is not too farfetched to state," writes Bini, "that
Blanchot's L'ecriture du desastreand even Bataille's central idea of the
insuperable differenceof the negative had their conscious sacrificial victim in Carlo Michelstaedter" (268). The dust cover of the book foregrounds the connection, introducing Michelstaedter as "a forerunner
of Blanchot, Bataille, and Derrida." Granted, these are the publisher's
words, not the author's,
but it is still clear that Bini gives
Michelstaedter a privileged place in what we can call, in the broadest
philosophical sense, the twentieth-century critique of the logocentric
tradition.
Michelstaedter's place in this critique relies on the opposition
between the key terms of his dissertation: persuasion and rhetoric. In
Bini's reading, persuasion is akin to the existentialist notion of authenticity. To be persuaded is to act in accordance with the true nature of
our being, to say and do only what we really believe, to commit ourselves first and foremost to the reality of our deepest, most inalienable
self. Rhetoric, on the other hand, encompasses the mass of practical
and theoretical procedures, concessions, and delusions informing the
greater part of all cognitive traffic-whether the scientific belief in fact,
the self-rationalizing ethics of business and pleasure, or the simple
faith that life can be properly reflected in the understanding.
What would seem to account for Michelstaedter's contemporaneity (if not postmodernity) is his vision of both the ubiquity and the
inadequacy of all such rhetoric. Hope though we may to translate persuasion into principles, systems, or practical suggestions, it is entirely
off-limits to words-to
rhetoric. Persuasion, writes Bini, is "not an
intellectual category, but a moral category. It belongs to the realm of
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ethics, and it cannot be explained" (33). And again, "The nature of persuasioneis, in fact, its very unspeakability . . . it cannot be known but
must be lived" (35-36). On the surface, then, Michelstaedter's recognition of the unspeakability of all foundational matters puts him squarely in the company of the great thinkers of our century. But still, there is
a difference between Michelstaedter and many of these others. He
truly believed in the autonomous reality of this essential persuasion;
others saw persuasion as a function of rhetoric, a delusion invented by
words.
At this point the question arises whether this elusive and apparently inexpressible idea of persuasion names anything different from
the final topic of speech and religion since time immemorial (the true
nature of being and moral commitment, the real and not the apparent
order of things). Whether called truth or persuasion or the absolute
(and whether reserved for the seer, the saint, or the angel), it seems to
have been theorized incessantly in human history. Michelstaedter himself "articulates" it with vatic insistence, sometimes even suggesting
that the communication of persuasion is the sole hope for salvation.
The hero of persuasion speaks to people "in the voice of their own
pain, a voice distant to them." 6 Each word of the persuaded hero is
"luminous" and "creates the presence of that which is distant" (PR:
88).
From Parmenides to Henri Bergson, the dream has been one and
the same: a non-rhetorical world of meaning, identity, and being. If
this is logocentrism, then Michelstaedter is one of its most adamant
proponents of the last two thousand years. Here, at least, nothing
could be further from the deconstruction of linguistic metaphysics
which marks our era . Michelstaedter's resolution, in his own words, is
"to give back to words their original meanings" (20). If Christ and
Socrates offer models of persuasion, it is partially, Bini explains,
because "they alone did not entrust their thought to the written word"
(20).

The idea of persuasion itself does not grow more persuasive
when placed off-limits to language. It does not become more vibrant
when identified with the miracles of organic vitality. Radically different from the modes by which life typically forces us to operate, notes
Bini, "persuasion seems not to belong to men" (24); even so, it is men
who have devised the notion, and in countless articulated forms, some
sacrificing their lives to it,7 others arguing that it can be achieved in the
speechless purity of passionate, spontaneous action. Michelstaedter
even appears to suggest that persuasion might have been more the
rule than the exception before philosophers like Plato chose to separate theory from practice (Jean-Jacques Rousseau would have cast the
fateful date back earlier). Michelstaedter's Socrates is precisely an
example of how such persuasion can belong to men . And this, com-
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ments Bini, is because "Socrates' theoretical and ethical goals coincide;
his life was the enactment of his theory. He was a real persuaso"(26).
Today, after decades of phenomenological thinking (inaugurated
in the very years in which Michelstaedter was writing his dissertation), one wonders whether his distinction between theory and practice is the most useful way to understand the structure of human experience. Now it appears more likely that practice is always motivated
by theory in some way or other-always dependent on vision, intention and purpose, even in animals. Theory, too, appears always to
serve some practical interest. If anything, a pressing intellectual task
today is that of embracing the interconnections of the terms, discovering a way to conceive of the complexities of human behavior outside
of the difference or separation.
Assuming, however, that occasionally this spontaneous, undifferentiated fusion of theory and practice is mercifully accorded to
experience (in ecstasy, savagery, and Zen), the problems still linger. To
what extent does it make sense to extrapolate from this experience of
unity, as Michelstaedter does, a "one", fundamental state of being
underlying the two-ness, three-ness, and thousandfold variety of more
common, or "rhetorical", experience? (Something like this question led
one thinker of our century who was most truly inclined to mysticism,
Martin Buber, to abandon the early monistic metaphysics of his Daniel,
1913, for the dialogical historicity of I and Thou, 1923.) Besides, when
philosophers and moralists have called for a correspondence between
theory and practice they have usually had in mind the capitulation of
one to the other (more specifically, of practice to theory). Noble as the
intention may be, one would also like to see the operation moving, for
once, in the opposite direction (making theory answer to practice).
Here Michelstaedter remains regrettably on the far side of the fence.
Understood as ethical authenticity, persuasion has difficulty disengaging itself not only from the idea of theoretical truth (i.e., the intuited or experienced true nature of being) but also from the idea of a
self-governing subject. The authentic, autonomous person to whom
Michelstaedter advises us to conform our behavior now appears to be
more a fiction abstracted from all the contingencies ordinarily considered constitutive of selfhood: cultural tradition and prejudice, learning
and historical fortune , winding existential ways, the existential instabilities of care, emotion, and fear. Michelstaedter condemns all of these
components of identity as rhetorical additions, whisking his hero
away into the ethereal zones of divine self-standing: The persuaded
self is one who "must create himself and the world, which does not
exist before him : he must be master and not slave in his house" (PR:
73). And this belief in authentic self-making is another reason why
Michelstaedter is not as deconstructive as he often seems. He never
accepted the "ambivalence" (21) of that historical rhetoric in which all
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existence is caught, that hermeneutical reading and writing of life
which is complicitous with-if not responsible for-every intellectual
ideal. If he had truly accepted the ambivalence of rhetoric, as Bini
claims, the story she recounts would not hold half as well as it actually
does.
The story is a compelling one, beginning with Michelstaedter the
philosopher and ending with the poet and artist. In writing La persuasione e la rettorica,Michelstaedter runs up against a tragic paradox that
he cannot escape without abandoning his own vehicle of communication: conceptual reason can never bridge the distance that separates it
from the absolute it strives to articulate. This paradox, in turn, revalorizes Michelstaedter 's work in poetry and drawing, those activities
which have generally been ranked second to his thinking. Bini, however, sees them, and not the dissertation, as the genres in which
Michelstaedter invested his greatest resources. We know, for example,
that the concepts of philosophy struck him as "dead bodies without
souls" (10). Poetry, by contrast, extended the promise of a "synthetic
image; the image that does not explain, but evokes; the image that
does not claim the assent of theoretical reason, but hopes for that of
the feelings, through which truth can often speak with a more effective
voice" (10). At the very end of Michelstaedter's trajectory-away, that
is, from the sterility of language-lie his portraits of living individuals.
It was in these hundreds of sketches "that Michelstaedter was to find
his authentic form of expression, the means by which he could finally
defeat rettorica. With pencil or black chalk, the simplest of tools, he
could try to catch the fleeting spark of the soul and with rapid strokes
fix it on paper" (10). The culminating chapter of Bini's book, examining Michelstaedter's work in that visual medium where "between the
subject portrayed and the beholder there is no longer any rhetorical
mediation"
(10), is appropriately
called "The Authenticity
of
Drawing."
Here, too, a deconstructive sensibility would have to ask: If the
division between signs and meanings is as absolute as Michelstaedter
claims it is, would it not apply to drawing as well? Doesn't even a
visual representation give us only the body of a person, not the soul
(or the image of a body, the projection, as it were, of one "I" onto
another)? If Michelstaedter had truly accepted the ambivalence of
rhetoric, he might have had no ground at all for privileging drawing
over writing, for both operate equally under the sway of the signrevealing and hiding at once . That "communication from within" (216)
at which Expressionist artists aimed is as impossible to achieve in
drawing as in philosophy.
Nevertheless, Bini is certainly right about Michelstaedter 's
attraction to the sketch. There is a sense in which the portrait tries to
lay hands on the living core of an individual in a way that philosophy
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generally does not (over and beyond the efforts of Kierkegaard,
Nietzsche, and the dialogical Plato). It is also true that an artistic
arrangement of signs can overcome the stereotypical associations of
those signs themselves, especially the associations accruing to the
semantics of speech. But here the question is simply this: How committed was Michelstaedter to exploring such arrangements? His poetry is not Dino Campana's or Giuseppe Ungaretti's. It is not visionary
or hermetic, but conceptual and cerebral, often rawly allegorical, articulated in many of the same terms as his philosophy:
Io son solo, lontano, io son diversoaltro sole, altro vento e piu superbo
volo per altri deli e la mia vita ...
Ma ora qui che aspetto, e la mia vita perche non vive,
perche non avviene?
Che e questa luce, che e questo calore,
questo ronzar confuso, questa terra,
questo cielo che incombe? M'e straniero
l' aspetto d' ogni cosa, m' e nemica
questa natura! basta! voglio uscire
da questa trama d'incubi! la vita!
la mia vita! il mio sole!8

I am alone, distant, differentanother sun, another wind
my life is a prouder flight through other skies ...
But it is here, now, that I wait,
my life, why does it not live,
why does nothing happen?
What is this light, this heat,
this confused buzzing, this earth,
this sky which hangs so heavily above us?
The appearance of things
is strange to me;
An enemy to me, this nature,
Enough! I want to go, to escape
this nightmare plot which is life!
My life! My sun!
[translated by ElizabethPallitto]
While these may not be his most fortunate lines, even when considering Michelstaedter's
poetry as a whole we find that it rarely
embodies persuasion (as art presumably would, in a classical unity of
form and content). Instead, it speaks around it-and less persuasively
in most cases than his prose.
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And what of the idea that truth might speak more effectively in
poetry, where it appeals to the feelings rather than reason? But if the
entire polemic of La persuasionee la rettoricais directed against the irrationality and cowardice of feeling! Bini herself sometimes agrees with
Campanilla that Michelstaedter committed suicide precisely because
he was unable to tolerate the autonomy of his feelings (especially
wrath, resentment, and guilt). One can even imagine a scenario in
which the chronologically last Michelstaedter-the
Michelstaedter of
La persuasione,who limited his readings to the Gospels, Tolstoy, and a
handful of moral, theoretical texts-argues that poetry is a spiritually
immature form of expression, a language of emotional plaint rather
than of firm and stable conviction.
Similar considerations can be applied to his drawings. The vast
majority of them are caricatures-attacks on stereotypes, not positive,
alternative visions. Instead of a coincidence of form and content, they
represent a schism (a procedure Bini eloquently glosses by reference to
Pirandello's umorismo, psychoanalytic theory, and the formal distortions of Expressionistic art). The suspicion remains that, up to the end,
Michelstaedter never succeeded in lifting his art and his poetry above
the conceptual deadlock of persuasion and rhetoric (which did, however, grow eloquent in La persuasione).He never succeeded in persuading
himself of the persuasive power of these forms of rhetoric. (This is, of
course, speaking of the whole; there are striking exceptions, where
Michelstaedter shows himself as truly the equal of his artistic contemporaries, especially the portraits of himself and his family of the last
three years. Not surprising, though, these are more than sketches.)
And this brings us to a question that no discussion of
Michelstaedter is able to avoid, namely, the question of the final outcome of Michelstaedter's spiritual journey, crowned by suicide. On the
one hand, Bini recognizes that a literal commitment to persuasion can
only be deadly. Michelstaedter "knows that to make himself an
absolute being is to negate himself as a finite being, that to make himself an eternal being is to negate himself as becoming. Michelstaedter's
suicide seems at this point to have been a coherent and logical consequence" (39-40). On the other hand, she is not willing to interpret his
death as an inherently philosophical gesture. Acquainted as few others
with the torments by which Michelstaedter's mind was racked, she
interprets his suicide as probably a confession that he was unable to
live up to his highest ideal of ethical unity. Here Bini takes issue with
another, common reading of his suicide as a logical exemplificationof
the same ideal, or as a symptom of the nihilism inherent in persuasion
itself. To believe in this unity of theory and act, writes Bini, is only "to
fall prey to the systematic fallacy that mocks postmodernists" (259),
namely, the assumption that since Michelstaedter insisted on an
absolute coherence of theory and practice he must also have enacted
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that coherence in his own, final gesture. While the objection is well
taken, one also wants to ask why we should want to deny
Michelstaedter such coherence at the one moment when he made the
most absolute decision of his life. To be sure, suicide is always an
admission that practice (life) is not conforming to theory. The significant difference in Michelstaedter's case is that his own theories left
him virtually no practical space in which to pursue the match. By considering persuasion something that practice could never live up to
(and insisting that there is no other value in life whatsoever)
Michelstaedter foreclosed all of his possibilities. In this sense his suicide was plainly occasioned by philosophy (irrespective of what other,
concrete reasons might also have accompanied it, such as a quarrel
with his mother the morning of the act, or a lethal disease from which
he may have been suffering). In short, it is impossible to divorce
Michelstaedter's suicide from the negative judgments he passes on life
at every turn. "There is no need," he writes in La persuasione,"to continue a life which, wanting in everything, is revealed not to be life"
(70).

What would it have taken for Michelstaedter to continue to live?
Had he not chosen to believe that the absolute, the eternal, and the
true were the stuff of which life is made, the intolerable contradiction
of experience would have vanished-and,
along with it, perhaps also
the suicidal temptation. But short of this, Michelstaedter would have
had to find a way to valorize the contradiction between rhetoric and
persuasion, the rhetorical failure of existence itself. Bini suggests that
silence was the inevitable consequence of his philosophical battleand silence is a stand-in for death. But one could also claim that only
there, where silence and death seem to be the only solutions to the
absurdity of experience, do art and life begin. Only there does one
assume personal responsibility for shaping meaning, for actualizing a
truly persuasive form of life. To continue to live Michelstaedter would
have had to cease railing against language, convention, and interpretation. He would have had to shift more of his energy toward the production of art. His talents were so exceptional that he would have found
remarkable ways to lift his painting, poetry, and philosophy above the
phantoms by which they were haunted-to
coerce them, as it were,
into a new type of vitality. Where negativity, duplicity, and rhetoric are
prime movers in the demand for meaning and life, there creativity
accepts its true challenge. Incidentally, Adriano Tilgher recognized
something of this in his review of La persuasione in La Stampa, 23
December, 1922, p. 3.
What emerges from Bini's study of the full range of
Michelstaedter' s work is a sense that the relevance of his thinking
today ultimately hinges on how persuasive we find his Hauptbegriffthe moral and intellectual ideal of persuasion. In an age where, to bor-
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row Mario Perniola's sardonic words, "everything
seems to be
reduced . . . to the daily tactical ministering of the spheres of feelings,
interest, and ideas which appear to be obvious," it is more difficult
than ever to respond passionately to discussions of truth and unyielding commitment. 9 We have become pragmatic through and through,
cultivating only experiences and techniques we know to work. We
humor only ideas we can translate into palpable results. It is in this
type of setting that Perniola prescribes Michelstaedter as a curative. To
do so, however, he must rethink the significance of persuasion.
For Perniola persuasion is not a condition in which the self
becomes what it most inalienably is-immune, as it were, to the allure
of rhetorical deceit. Persuasion is essentially amorJati, or love of fate:
In Greek, persuade , or convince, is peftho. Originally the root peith- was
only intransitive: it did not mean to convince someone, but to have trust,
or to trust someone. The transitive use of the verb does not belong to the
ancient Greek and represents a later change. The fundamental meaning
of persuasion is trust. To be persuaded thus means to have great trust, to
be or remain in a state of trust. (5: 27-28)

Trust is not equivalent to the futural, messianic orientation of
"faith"; it is a bearing toward "something already given, something
present," a condition of a person "who feels safe because he can rely
on a solid reality" (5: 28).
This vision of persuasion sidesteps the tragic implications that
Bini so carefully ferrets out from its textual descriptions. Gone are the
speechless dilemmas, the beckoning of death, the self-immolation of
Michelstaedter's
persuaded heroes. And this is primarily because
Perniola is interested in Michelstaedter as a model for a new type of
project, one radically different from the two caught up in the battle
between modernism and postmodernism, idealism and pragmatism,
the "sixties" and the "eighties" of our century .
The sixties and early seventies, claims Perniola, were modernist
in demeanor: militant, revolutionary, and intent on the future, protesting the present in deference to social and political ideals. The eighties,
by contrast, were postmodernist: passeistes,dispassionately immersed
in what has already come to pass, disillusioning or entertaining as the
case may be. The postmodernism
of the eighties, writes Perniola,
"oozes with boredom . This total acquiescence and consent to universal
inconsistencies, and this state of misery, when it comes to emotions
and feelings," generates only flatness, emanating intellectual pretensions which somersault "in every direction" (3-4: 42). As we emerge
from this postmodernist period, he claims, we may finally be able to
grasp the "vitality and fecundity" of Michelstaedter's thinking for the
nineties. Very simply, it consists in his call for a "strong feeling" for the
present-or what neither the sixties nor the eighties respected. Strong
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feeling offers an alternative to activism and passivism alike, both
equally evasive. In Michelstaedter's idea of passionate commitment to
what actually is at any moment, of trust in the phenomena composing
historical presence, lies, for Perniola, the "point of departure of a new
cultural tendency" (3-4: 41).
What is implied by this strong feeling for the present? To begin
with: an overcoming of obnoxious, self-assertive subjectivity (though
not in the manner of "sentimental Postmodern softness," 3-4: 43).
Perniola is almost alone in making an issue of Michelstaedter's critique of vitalistic subjectivity-the
notion that human motivation can
be anchored in needs, desires, or lust for power. If subjectivism means
acting in accordance with some form of this psychological or biological substratum (including the primal, Cartesian consciousness of the
"thinking I"), then Perniola is right: Michelstaedter is not a subjectivist. He wants people to be absorbed in things. "Persuasion," he
writes, is "wanting to possess oneself in the things and in the things
oneself" (qtd. 3-4: 44, though the citation is not exact: "veder oggettivamente ... e l' estrema coscienza di chi e uno colle cose, ha in se tutte
le cose: ... il persuaso: il dio," PR: 123). This externalized type of identity gives rise to a new immediacy of being, both phenomenologically
and temporally, experienced quite humbly in listening to "that which
emerges from the present, to that which is coming (sopraggiunge)hie et
nunc, and to that which is manifested in things" (3-4: 43).
This non-subjective feeling for temporal, phenomenological presence spills over into new types of commitment. One enters the "age of
the thing" which ensues the postmodern "age of the image" by being a
"high profile intellectual" (3-4: 47). Strong feeling issues into strong
writing. In the nineties, strong writers replace the weak writers of the
eighties as well as the maftres a penser of the sixties. Not authors or
intellectuals in the classical sense, they are gatherers of traces, bearing
witness to experience not in exclusively authorial forms but also in
non-authorial ones (iconographic documentations, the intellectual' s
library, tomb, and so on). In essence, a high-profile intellectual is not a
subject at all but "a thing," entering into "direct contact ... between
thought and the world of history" (3-4: 46, 49). Silencing all "inordinate affections," desires, and opinions, this new type of thinker may
even be more of a reader than a writer, making "him/ herself into the
single conduit of phenomena, their place of transit, their gateway to
phenomena which surprise, upset, and amaze us, which constantly
present themselves in an unexpected and unpredictable way" (3-4: 49).
The time for such non-subjective intellectuals is certainly long
overdue. And yet, it is unclear how much sustenance they will find in
Michelstaedter's example. He admittedly defends valuing the exclusive reality of single instants of experience. As for whether there is any
experience left to such instants, however, or whether he values the
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phenomena they make present-this is another story. Michelstaedter
radically rejects the worth of everything we ordinarily think of as characterizing experience: the temporal progression of things, their perishing and changing, their foot in the past and their step to the future.
While he seems to recommend viewing every occurrence as "once and
once only," there is, in his work, no love of experience which supports
an analogous stance in Rilke or Nietzsche, no verbal or visual celebrations of the wonders of unrepeatable presence. In fact, one can hardly
imagine a more widespread condemnation of life as it appears (as it
comes "to presence" on the human and organic level) than we find in
this fiery antagonist of desire and need, of affection and adaptation, of
dependence and insecurity. 10 In Michelstaedter's view, everything for
which humans ordinarily live amounts to nothing. Moreover, all this
nothing is a cowardly compensation for the dread of that nothing
which truly is at any moment of time. To commit to the present in the
manner of Michelstaedter's persuasion is also to commit to nothing.
The nihilism which could have yielded amorfati is closer to amor vacui.
Even the apparent non-subjectivism of this presential feeling
runs into resistance from Michelstaedter's text, seeming more of a
promise than a position his words decisively take. Though persuasion
means having "nel possesso del mondo il possesso di se stesso" (PR:
82), the emphasis remains much more strongly on the self than the
world. A persuaded person, writes Michelstaedter, "cannot affirm
himself in the affirmation of those [needs] which are given to him ...
by a contingency external and prior to him ... he is alone in the desert,
and must create everything on his own: god and country and family
and water and bread" (PR: 70). Could it be that the goal of persuasion
is a type of subjectivity after all, aiming "to affirm the person who possesses reason" (PR: 85)? Life must consist in "creating everything by
oneself [da se,which also means "out of oneself"], not adapting to any
way ... you have to create each thing: in order to possess your life as
your own .... Christ saved himself because out of his own mortal life
he was able to create the god: the individual" (PR: 103-04).
While Perniola's strong, non-subjective feeling allows for the
experience of what is distant, "foreign, other, different" (3-4: 44), in
Michelstaedter this otherness is entirely generated from one selfsame
self, now dilating to encompass the entire universe (a universe not
composed of specific differences, but a limitless expanse of estrangement, in which all cows and cats are black). The seeming "disappearance of the subject" is thus at bottom a "possession of oneself" (3-4: 44,
46), of oneself as pure spirit. This new philosophy of presence now
appears to have more in common with the visions of saints and
ascetics than with empirical love. As Bini has noted, Michelstaedter's
sympathies are deeply Buddhistic (124-25, 245-28).
Perniola's strong feeling stands "at the opposite pole of negative
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thought and the various forms which it has recently adopted: crisis of
reason, nihilism, weak thought, and so forth" (3-4: 48). How can we
place his Michelstaedter back to back with the view presented by the
very figure alluded to in the phrases "negative thought" and the "crisis of reason" -Massimo Cacciari? We can, I believe, if we tie the positivity of Michelstaedter's professed ethic more closely to the negativity
of his metaphysics. In his second essay for Differentia,Perniola makes
this negativity more explicit than in the first. There he characterizes
persuasion as a paradoxical convergence of movement and immobility. In the "radical extraneousness [of experience] from which it is
impossible to escape," the persuaded self does indeed aspire to
absolute autonomy and self-sufficiency (5: 27). The "liveliness and
exteriority" of persuasion is necessarily and intimately tied to a
descent into the abyss of one's innate insufficiency. And thus, the selfenergizing process of "becoming a flame" is ineluctably a "becoming
stone," and articulates an enigmatic "synthesis of sensitivity and coldness" (5: 29).
What Perniola calls the enigma of Michelstaedter, Cacciari calls
his aporia. One of the most single-minded
philosophers
of the
absolute in recent memory (where the "absolute" is understood as the
original and impossible object of philosophy and religion, the shapeless, unspeakable goal of every concerted linguistic effort), Cacciari
finds in Michelstaedter the same battle which is so often played out in
the Habsburg culture to which the young philosopher belonged. 11
With Cacciari we are closer to Bini's reading than Perniola' s. Here the
opposition between, let us say, the one "true" way of persuasion and
the many ways of discursive deception is so radical that the very
notion of unifying theory and practice becomes unthinkable.
Persuasion is not only "para-doxical," it is also para-rzhysin,writes
Cacciari in the second of his two Michelstaedter essays. 2 Socrates, the
persuaded one, is "atopos"; what he says "cannot take root" (102). The
insuperable difference of persuasion that is built into the duplicity of
peitho: a divine peitho on the one hand and the oscillating peitho of
mortals on the other, ineluctably governed by the built-in requiremen ts of social and political interaction
(98). For Cacciari,
Michelstaedter severs the two voices of peitho in primordial fashion.
No longer can there be any question of actualizing persuasion in feeling or unified action. Between operariand the True Way, between work
and health, remains an incommensurable distance. In truth what a
person enacts in persuasion is nothing less than the immanent desert
of the soul, or the silence of the very ground of the soul. "He wants to
be autarkes.... he knows no Other to whom to address himself" (108).
Persuasion thus takes up its place in the history of that tragic
spirituality which runs from Aeschylus's Agamemnon to the absurd
Christianity of Kierkegaard. La persuasione appears to be a unique
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effort to reconcile pagan trust with Christian faith, peitho with pistis
(107). Here Christ is far from a model for practicing what one preaches. Rather, Michelstaedter's Christianity is all contained in the superhuman nature of the love it proposes, in the maniacal courage of the
freedom it urges. "The Christian God does not contradict life but
requires an impossible true life" (109). And Michelstaedter' s aporia
becomes that of "having to want the true Way, being able only to want
it, and not being able to have it while wanting it" (110).
In Cacciari's radical rhetoric (appropriate, I believe, to the fundamentality of the contradictions with which Michelstaedter is concerned) lies a final, essential perception. The bind involved in the will
to persuasion is the experience of persuasion itself. The only enactment of persuasion lies in embracing its own impossibility. Cacciari
sees this more clearly than others (and probably more clearly than
Michelstaedter himself). To be persuaded is knowingly and willingly
to suffer the impossibility of the condition itself. It is neither to dismiss
the persuasive ideal as irrelevant to the pragmatic operations of the
world nor to relegate it to philosophical theory. Rather, it is to show
the dream in its ineffability, to keep it sacrosanct, to allow it to mark
the limits of all knowledge and intuition-in short, to voice its silence.
This is the "most ancient" persuasion of life, around which words
turn.
True life is not to be located in a Beyond that reason cannot
attain; "true life, its perfection, is the accomplishment of this life: the
impossible perfect satisfaction of its erga-to which no method can
lead. Persuasion is the silence and peace of these words-and
it
reveals itself in them as the uncapturable 'dia logon' " (110). In still
another way, persuaded life does not lie in an abstract alternative to
the "sick" life of pain, desire, and need; it consists in "the coincidence
in process between a person's existence and a radical endurance of the
pain connected to this existence. The present of persuasion means
being en energhiain pain, not beyond it" (82).
Perniola and Cacciari do not disagree in viewing persuasion as
an existential response to the perfect imperfection of the historical
process (no less than Bini does). If anything, they disagree about how
to understand this process. Perniola emphasizes its phenomenal coming-into-being in an infinitely differentiated flow of autonomous
things and appearances. Cacciari places the emphasis on its ontological difference: the unthinkable gap between its being. Or perhaps the
real difference lies here: just what to make of this inherently duplicitous presence. Perniola envisions an ethical response of strong participation.13 Cacciari is primarily concerned with what the presence
inspires in the way of vision, before the issue of ethics has even been
raised.
In Cacciari's reading, every expression of persuasion is antinomi-
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an (where nomos is the law, the rule, the doxa to which meanings are
typically reduced). What is "unauthentic," in other words, is not a particular use of language but language's very constitution (72). The closest it can come to authenticity is to speak in recognition of its own
futility. The most striking expression of this aporia (profusely revealed
by the expressionist art of Michelstaedter's time) is the "knowledge"
that he found intolerable-namely,
the sense that the greatest closeness to meaning is achieved by the greatest rhetorical distance. The
keeper of language must be pulled by the hair.
When Virginia Woolf wrote that "in or about December, 1910,
human character changed," she had something like this fight in
rnind. 14 She did not mean that human nature had become different, but
that the conventions by which it had once been represented had now
broken down. Like Michelstaedter, the writers of the first decade of the
century were left facing a new type of "Mrs. Brown without any
method of conveying her to the reader" (332).
Their suspicion her essence could not be depicted by a rhetoric of
material or existential conditions explains the "breaking and falling,
crashing and destruction" accompanying all literary efforts to rescue
her from her material and linguistic entrapment (334).15 Thus, when
confronting the art of the beginning of the century, Woolf advises, "we
must reconcile ourselves to a season of failures and fragments. We
must reflect that where so much strength is spent on finding a way of
telling the truth, the truth itself is bound to reach us in rather an
exhausted and chaotic condition." Mrs. Brown, in other words, will
appear a little pale and dishevelled by the time her rescuers reach her.
And, in the proximity of this rhetorical rescue operation, it will be
above all "the sound of their axes that we hear" (335-36).
This is the critical artistic moment which comes to expression in
Michelstaedter (and which points ahead to an era in which crisis does
not have to prove suicidal). Few artists make the sound of the axes as
eloquent as Michelstaedter-in
his conceptual dilemmas, in those
drawings which Bini has brought to our attention, in the contortions of
a style forged in prose. Among the lessons to be learned from the
Michelstaedter of Bini, Perniola, and Cacciari today is also this one:
that only in a redemption of rhetoric can the soul find its silent persuasion.
NOTES
1. On the history of the Michelstaedter Foundation, see the pamphlet by
Antonella Gallarotti, II Fonda Michelstaedter della Biblioteca Civica (Gorizia:
Dispensa dell'Universita della Terza Eta, 1990). On the Foundation's holdings,
see Gallarotti, "Ricordare attraverso la carta: Carlo Michelstaedter," La speranza: Attraverso l'ebraismogoriziano,Catalogue of the exhibition in Gorizia, 7 July
- 20 October, 1991 (Monfalcone, Italy: Edizioni della Laguna, 1991), 87-104. The
editions of Michelstaedter's writings that have been published by Adelphi
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Edizione in Milan, all edited by Sergio Campailla and (except for one) in inexpensive paperbacks, are La persuasionee la rettorica(1982), Epistolario (1983),
Poesie (1987), and II dialogode/lasalute e altri dialoghi(1988). Sergio Campailla's
own studies include Pensiero e poesia di Carlo Michelstaedter(Bologna: Patron,
1973), A Jerri corti con la vita (Gorizia: Arti grafiche Campestrini, 1974), Scrittori
giuliani (Bologna: Patron , 1980). Before Campailla, to be sure, a number of
excellent studies of La persuasionehad already seen the light. Alfredo Giuliani,
the novissimo, had done his thesis on Michelstaedter in 1949 (Rome). Books
had been written by Cerruti and others in the fifties and sixties.
Michelstaedter's
schoolmates Gaetano Chiavacci and Arangio-Ruiz had
brought him to the attention of Italian philosophers and writers already in the
twenties. For a complete bibliography of Michelstaedter criticism up to 1986,
see Francesco Muzzioli, Michelstaedter(Lecce: Milella, 1987): 75-194. To date,
the most ample collection of Michelstaedter's writings remains Opere, ed.
Giovanni Chiavacci (Florence: Sansoni, 1958). A splendid catalogue of
Michelstaedter's
complete drawings and paintings, recently edited by
Antonella Gallarotti, is L'immagine irraggiungibile: Dipinti e disegni di Carlo
Michelstaedter(Monfalcone: Edizioni della Laguna, 1992).
2. Giovanni Gentile's review of La persuasionee la rettoricaappears in La
Critica 20 (1922): 332-36. For Croce's review see the bibliography by Muzzioli
cited above.
3. In order of publication, the main studies since 1980 are: Cristina
Benussi, Negazione e integrazione nella dialettica di Carlo Michelstaedter(Rome:
Edizioni dell' Ateneo & Bizzarri, 1980); Claudio La Rocca, Nichilismo e retorica:
II pensiero di Carlo Michelstaedter (Pisa: ETS, 1983); Piero Pieri, La differenza
ebraica:Ebraismoe grecita in Michelstaedter (Bologna: Cappelli, 1984); Giorgio
Brianese, L'arcoe il destino: Interpretazionedi Michelstaedter(Padova: Francisci,
1985); Francesco Fratta, II doveredell'essere:Critica de/la metafisicae istanza etica
in Carlo Michelstaedter (Milan: UNICOPLI, 1986); Piero Pieri, Saggio su Carlo
Michelstaedter(Bologna: Cappelli, 1989). One might also read the interesting
novel by Claudio Magri s on Enrico Mereula, Michelstaedter's best friend from
Gorizia, Un altro mare (Milan: Garzanti, 1991).
4. Daniela Bini's book was published in Gainesville by the University
Press of Florida in 1992. Mario Perniola's
two essays are "Beyond
Postmodernism:
Michelstaedter, Strong Feeling, the Present," trans. by
Daniela Bini and Renate Holub, and "Enigmas of Italian Temperament," trans.
by Aninne Schneider . They appear, respectively,
in Diff erentia 3-4
(Spring/ Autumn 1989): 39-50 and Differentia5 (Spring 1991): 19-30. Massimo
Cacciari's DPAN: Meridiens de la decision dans la pensee contemporaine,
trans. by Michel Valensi, has been published in Combasby Editions de l'Eclat,
1992. The two essays it contains on Michelstaedter are "Interpretation de
Michelstaedter"
(63-86) and "La lutte 'sur' Platon: Michelstaedter
et
Nietzsche" (87-110). The first essay has appeared in Italian in the Rivista di
estetica22 (1986): 21-36.
5. The idea of Michelstaedter as a precursor of Heidegger is first systematically argued, if not fully convincingly, by Ioachim Ranke, "II pensiero di
Michelstaedter: Un contributo allo studio dell' esistenzialismo italiano,"
Giornalecriticode/lafilosofiaitaliana41, no. 4 (1962): 518-39. Additional links are
explored by La Rocca, Brianese, and Cacciari in the studies cited above. Ties
between Michelstaedter and Wittgenstein, also largely problematic in nature,
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have been drawn not only by Bini but also by Cacciari and La Rocca as well as
Gianni Carchia, "Linguaggio e mistica in Carlo Michelstaedter," Rivista di
estetica21 (1981): 126-32.
6. Carlo Michelstaedter, La persuasione e la rettorica, ed. by Sergio
Campailla (Milan: Adelphi, 1982), 87. Hereafter citations from this text (abbreviated PR) will be identified parenthetically.
7. It is worth noting that on his list of countless deluded "types" who
function rhetorically-scientists
and shopkeepers, educators and athletesMichelstaedter hardly finds room for priests and prophets.
8. Carlo Michelstaedter, "Risveglio," lines 22-33, Poesie,69-70.
9. Mario Perniola, "Beyond Postmodernism: Michelstaedter, Strong
Feeling, the Present," Differentia3-4: 40. References to this and Perniola's other
essay on Michelstaedter (fully documented in note 4) will henceforth be identified in parentheses, where the volume number of Differentiais followed by
page numbers (thus, here, 3-4: 40).
10. Even in the inorganic realm of chemicals, the very principle of life (as
expressed, for example, in the tendency of hydrogen to "lust" after chloride
and thus form the lethal compound hydrochloride) is suicidal (PR: 46-47).
11. See Cacciari's penetrating study of Adolf Loos, Arnold Schoenberg,
and a dozen other compatriots of Michelstaedter in Dalio Steinhof Prospettive
viennesi del primo Novecento(Milan: Adelphi, 1980).
12. Massimo Cacciari, DPAN: 102 (full reference in note 4). Hereafter
page numbers will appear in the text parenthetically.
13. In Del sentire (Turin: Einaudi, 1991), Perniola elaborates at much
greater length the aesthetic implications of this type of ethic.
14. Virginia Woolf, "Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown" (1924), in Collected
Essays, vol. I (London : Hogarth Press, 1966): 319-37. Page numbers will now
follow parenthetically.

